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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DELTA H. LEWIS, \ 
Plaintiff and Appellant,/ 
- vs.- BRIEF OF 
C. A. SAVAGE, KENNETH C. 
SAVAGE, C. A. SAVAGE doing 
business as SAVAGE COAL\1 APPJ1jLLANT 
AXD. TL\.fBER COMPANY and Appeal No. 8733 
SAVAGE COAL AND TIMBER 
CO~fPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent· 
srrATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
This suit is for per.sonal injuries sustained by plaint-
iff in a collision between her husband's car, which he· 
was ·driving, with the rear end of defendants' truck 
standing still between Oak Street and Alemeda Road 
on the Main North-South Highway in the City of Ala-
meda in Idaho, at early dawn on August 2nd, 1955. · 
Because of a city ordinance of Alameda, set O:tJt in 
the complaint and admitted b~' stipulation to be in force 
at the time, against parking trucks on said highway be-
tween Oak Street and Alameda Road, defendants amend-
ed their Answer at the trial over plaintiff's objection to 
evade an admission in the first Answer that they were 
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parked at the time of the collision at the forbidden place. 
1Ir. Aadnesen for defendants, asked defendant, 
J{enneth Savage on the stand, ''In relation to the place 
where your truck was parked, was· there any street 
lan1ps in the area~" (Our italics) 126 R 3. Kenneth 
SaYage sa~'s it was 15 or 20 Ininutes from the time he 
first stopped until he felt the impact. 
Patroln1an Wharton showed up on the job im-
nlediately after the accident. Testimony of C. A. Savage. 
113 R 1. 
\Vharton had seen the truck standing there earlier 
that morning. 44 R 16. He did not observe anybody in 
J:;oYelnent around the truck. 44 R 2/. A street light 
waf' in front close to the truck. 126 R 5. 
\Yharton, after fir~t seeing the standing truck, in 
orrler for hin1 and the court to fairly estimate the time it 
~tood there before the second time he saw it. relates the 
thing·s he did. An1ong them talking 15 or 20 minutes to 
the sergeant in the station, using the toilet, etc. convinc· 
ing that 30 1ninutes would have elapsed from when the 
truck fi r~t was seen by Wharton until the collision. 56 R 
11. 
Lewis sa~·s to Savage at the scene, "And I asked 
hhn if he - if he had been asleep, there and he told me 
tlw:·' had pulled up to stop and rest a few minutes." 
17 R 28. This conversation is not denied by either de-
fendant when on the stand. 
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When· Kenneth Savage pulled up there he pushed 
his headlights "down on park". 136 R 23. Therefore, 
we say the evidence does not just strongl,\' preponderate 
that defendants car was "parked". The proof is that it 
was parked. 
The Alameda City Ordinance governing parking 
at night on the main highway where the collision occurred 
was partly alleged in the complaint, Ordinance No. 280, 
adopted February 20, 1952. 
"1. Unlawful to park any vehicle on Yellow-
stone Avenue (Highway 91-191) between 
one o'clock A.M. and six o'clock A.M. be-
tween Oak Street and Alameda Road.'' 
By stipulation filed of counsel for plaintiff and de-
fendants, it was admitted that this Ordinance was in 
existence at the time. ''But by this stipulation the de-
fendants do not in any manner waive any objection to 
the application of any ordinance of any nature to the 
above entitled matter, nor that the violation of such 
ordinance, if any, represented any evidence of negli-
gence.'' Kenneth Wharton testified that the truck was 
stopped between Oak Street and Alameda Road on 
Yellowstone Highway. 49 R pointing to map. Lewis 
s.ays he arrived in Alameda at approximat~ly quarter 
to five in the. morning. 11 R 14. 
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint is: 
''That the main highway upon which defendants 
truck was parked, and said . 'X ellowstone A venue 
(Highway 91-191) are one and the same street, 
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and the said truck was parked within the said 
City of Alameda." 
From the original Answer (before amendmen,t 
over objection), ''Defendants admit Paragraphs 
1, 2 and 5 and deny paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7." 
There is no evidence at all in the record that Lewis, 
plaintiff, was driving at any rapid or negligent speed. 
An~~ evidence about it is to the contrary. ''Did Lewis 
tell you, that in his opinion, he was under the speed limit 
at that tin1e ~ He said he thought he was not exceeding 
the speed limit." (Officer Wharton) 76 R 5. "The 
~peed limit was 35 Iniles per hour.'' 76 R 12. 
Le"'i~ was moving in the slow lane. Above and 
do~e to, and in front of the truck with lumber lengthen-
ing the obstacle, was a street light: n1eeting him just be-
fore the collision were the lights of another car, to the 
rear of this was the oncoming lights of the "milk truck." 
There were no flares out behind the truck, though it 
\\'af; on a 1nain arterial highway from Salt Lake City to 
Butte, with traffic even at that hour. son1ewhat heavy, 
on the n1ain street of two cities. to appearances only 
one comparatively large city. with ordinance that for- iT., 
barle parking where they stopped. 
The plaintiff was n1ore ~rieYously injured than the ~('[l}r 
lt•a rnerl trial judge found. :\s it is not the practice of 
appellate courts to assess rlama~es on reversal in 
ea~e~ of this ehararter "~e do not specify wherein the 
finding does not n1easure up to the undisputed evidence 
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5, 
of)ife endu:dng injuries. 
The defendants were conscious of a dangerous load, 
the lumber behind the body of the truck. They had 
placed half-way up the load ten inch red flags at each 
corner. 123 R 5. They had flares in the truck, 123 R 21. 
\Vhen they stopped, they did not put out any flares, 
123 R 19. rrhe flares were of the reflector type. 123 R 26. 
"The type you sit on a little pedestal". 123 R 28. 
''Mr. Aadnesen Q: Now would you describe what 
traffic you saw in that period of time when you were 
parked?" (We underscore; Mr. Aadnesen 's spoken Eng-
lish is faultless). 
A. "There was a few, very few cars went by, but 
you don't pay much attention to them because they are 
going hr.'' 129 R 21. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That the District Court erred in dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action. 
2. That the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding of the Court Number 3 that the plaintiff's hus-
ban was operating his vehicle at an excessive rate of 
speed in view of the circumstances and failed to keep 
a proper lookout for other objects on the highway and 
that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries and damages and that said find-
ing is erroneous. 
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3. That the evidence is insufficient to support the 
finding of the Court Number 4 that defendants were 
not guilty of any negligence which was a proxim~te 
cau~e oi' plaintiff's injuries and damages and that said 1.~ 
finding is erroneous. Y.ien~ 
4. The findings and conclusions are insufficient to 
support the judgment. 
5. The District Court inproperly failed and refused 
to make findings of fact on all material issues, as follows: 11 
(a) As to the existence of Alemeda City Ordi-
nance No. 280; 
(b) As to the applicability of said ordinance to 
defendants' conduct and as to defendants' 
violation of it; 
(c) As to the issue of defendants' negligence. 
6. The District Court improperly failed and refused 
to state its conclusions on the forfegoing issues of fact. 
I. Plaintiff's (Appellant's) :Motion for a new trial 
or in the alternative, for the Court to a1nend findings, 
conclusions and to enter a new judgn1ent should have 
heen granted. 
ARG t ~:\1 ~~NT 
The prime, perhaps only serious, question before the 
Rupreme Court is \dwther there can be in law two proxi-
Inate causes each attributable to different actors. 
In failing to find "Thether or not defendants were 
L 1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
guilt~· of negligence and in finding one proximate cause 
in the acts of Lewis, found we think erroneously, to be 
negligent, the learned judge though he had covered the 
case sufficiently to compel a judgment in favor of the 
defendants. His failure to find anything about the con-
duct of the defendants, is as convincing as his finding 
of fact and conclusion of law to like effect, that he be-
lien~<l in the intervening ~ole cause doctrine. This wa3 
followed in t5ome earlier cases. It is not the accepted rule 
nowadays. 
All ol' the statement of points may be discussed 
under two separate arguments, each of which points up 
the error committed by the District Court in finding 
only one proximate cause. The two phases of arguments 
are: 
1. The Defendants' Negligence. 
2. The Proximate Cause 
1. The Defendants' Negligence 
The existence of the Alemeda City Ordinance pro-
hibiting parking on the main highway during the night 
cannot be denied. It is partially pleaded in the complaint, 
and set out in full in the stipulation on file herein. 20 R. 
''SECTION I. It shall be unlawful for any motor 
vehicle or other vehicles to be parked on the following 
streets within the City of Alemeda between the hours of 
1 o'clock a.m. and 6 o'clock a.m., to-wit: On Yellowstone 
Avenue from Oak Street and North to Alemeda Road". 
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As to the violations of this ordinance by the de-
fendants, the ·defendants' answer admitted that the 
truck was parked at the time of the collision at the for-
bidden place. 
Courts take Judicial notice of statement of facts 
1n prior pleadings in the same case, and they are evi-
dence against parties making them. 20 Am. Jur., Evi-
dence, Section 86, Page 104; Johnson vs. Butte & Su-
perior Copper Co., 41 Mont. 158, 108 Pac., 1057. 
Though by amendment admittances are changed to 
denials, the statement in any pleading in the same case 
in code states are probative and remain matters of Ju-
dicial Notice. 20 Am J ur ., Evidence, Section 86, Page 
104. 
Like,vise, counsel for the defendants referred to 
the defendants as being parked. 126 R 3. 
"The term "parking'' as applied to autmnobile3, 
include~ not only the voluntary act of leaving a car on 
the street unattended, but also the stopping of a car on 
a highway. though occupied and attended, for a length 
of time inconsistent with a reasonable use of the street 
for the purpose of travel, but does not generally in-
clued stopping at the curb for the purpose of taking in, 
or letting out, persons, or for the purpose of loading or 
unloading good.5. ·' 5 An1. Jur., Automobiles, Sec. 334, 
P. ()R2. 
One of the defendants testified that it was 15 or 20 
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minutes from the time the truck was first stopped until 
the impact was first felt. 126 R. 3. Patrolman Wharton 
testified as to all of the things he did from the ti1ne he 
first observed the truck stopped until the tin1e he was 
notified the accident had occured. These facts are re-
lated in the findings of fact, and are found at page 56 of 
the record. He estimated that 30 minutes had elapsed. 
56 R. 17. 
The accumulation of uncontradicted evidence here 
amounts to proof: (a) That the defendants were guilty 
of breach of the ordinance, and reasonable men cannot 
differ on that. The evidence is so strong (b) That the 
defendant were guilty of common law negligence, that 
plaintiff has not had a full fair trial until there is a 
finding on that question. 
As to (a) we submit that a negative finding if it had 
been made would be set aside by this Court without hesi-
tation on a reading of the testimony. 
As to (b) after consideration of the evidence, we 
believe a negative finding if it had been made, would be 
held erroneous, and in view of the uncontradicted evi-
dence, exceeding even the wide discretion of the trial 
presiding judge. 
This Court knows that it did not take more than 
3 or 4 minutes to tighten four chains and kick the tires 
(if that happened; they said nothing to Lewis about 
that, dum fervet opus). 
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The sanctity accorded the verdict of a jury on con-
flicting evidence is not present here. We submit that 
this record is such that this Court can judge the weight 
of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses as well 
a:' the presiding judge who saw and heard them. We 
. .;nhmit, that when the Court has read this record there 
will he a feeling to a moral certainty and beyond any 
reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of 
negligent breach of the ordinance~ that the evidence 
~ternly preponderates, that the:· were guilty of common 
la-w negligence, hy parking, or stopping for an unreason-
able length of time on a main arterial paved highway, 
behind a raised light, without putting out flares, (See 
annotation at 111 ALR 1516 as to this failure alone being 
negligence) with lumber extending 3 ft. 5 in. behind and 
aho ve their small rear lights; when a short distance in 
~ig-ht, in front, was a byway on which, if there was any 
need to ~top. they could and should have placed their 
Yehicle; when they observed cars going h:·: and must 
haYe observed car lights 1neeting them which would 
blind the vision of drivers of cars overtaking them; 
wl1en h:· hanging red flag:' on the rear, they told of 
their consciousness that their load was of more than or-
oinary danger to traffie going in the Saine direction. 
(The only extenuating circumstance is that officer 
'Yharton when he saw the truck standing there a half 
hour before the disaster, and nobody moving around it 
~honld havt> 1nade thein moYe on. This in law and, in 
faet, i~ no excu::-;e.) 
,· 
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To find that such conduct was not negligent, we sub-
mit would be outside the broad discretion of the trial 
judge. \Vhen no finding at all was made about either 
plw:-;e of defendants' conduct, the only reason why some 
finding was not made was that the earnest learned 
judge believed that when he had found one proximate 
cau~e, lJj:-; work was finished. It was all called to his 
attention by objection and motion to amend and supple-
ment the findings. 26 R. 
The Legislature of rtah has recognized that it is 
dangerous and negligent to leave occupied or unoccupied 
a Yehicle stopped on a public highway when it can be 
readily removed for repairs off of traffic lanes. (Out-
:-id<_. of cities) Section -H-6-101, 1 ~C.\, 1953. 
~\nd that when any load extends 4 feet behind the 
hod~· of the truck, at the time of night this disaster oc-
curred a red lantern must be displayed so it will be ob-
served 500 feet behind. (The defendants' load was with-
in 7 inches of breach of statute, 50 R 13, within 7 inches of 
negligence per se) by Utah Statute for rural highways 
(Idaho Statute is presumed identical) 
Section 41-6-128, r. C. A., 1953 
Under similar statutes it seems to be unanimously 
classed by courts also as negligence, not to move off if it 
can easily be done. 
Merback v. Blanchard (Wyo.) 105 Pac. 2d 272; 
Rhoden v. Peoria Creamery Co., 278 Ill. App. 452; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Watt v. Associated Oil Co. (Ore) 260 Pac. 1012; )~ 
Harkins v. __ Somerset Bus Co. (Pa.) 162A 163; ~~~ 
Silvey v. Harm (Cal.) 8 Pac. 2d 570. 
The burden of proving that it is not possible to 
tnove a disabled vehicle out of traffic lanes is upon him 
who stops a motor car in a lane of traffic. 
Certainly when many lawmakers have realized the 
carelessness of leaving a truck standing in lane of heavy 
traffic when a by-way is in sight close in front, intelli-
gent jurors realize the same hazard and when such facts 
are not disputed a full fair trial requires the judge to 
rnake a finding about it if the case is tried without a 
JUry. 
The undisputed facts more than preponderate to 
the conclusion that the defendants were guilty of negli-
gence and the trial court should have so found. 
2. The Proximate Cause: 
The trial Judge made a Finding, Conclusion and 
Decree that the negligence of the plaintiff's husband 
was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and 
damages. The trial Court made no Finding concerning 
the defendants' negligence, and it is ilnpossible to 
tell from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
whether or not the trial Court was holding that the de-
fendants were not negligent in any respect, or whether 
the defendants were negligent, but that their negligence 
was not a proxi1nate cause of the damage to the plaintiff. 
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Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure pro-
vides that in non-jury cases the Court find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusion thereon. 
A long line of l~tah cases, one of the latest being 
Gaddis Investment Company vs. Morrison, (1954), 3· U 
(2d) 43, 278 P (2d) 284, holds that failure to make Find-
ings of Fact on all material issues is reversible error 
where it is prejudicial. Plaintiff feels that she has not 
had her day in Court in view of the trial Court's failure 
to make con1plete Findings and Conclusions, and strongly 
urges that this failure on the part of the trial Court 
alone is reversible error. 
A review of the evidence establishes, in plaintiffs 
opinion, that there can be no doubt as to the defendants 
negligence. rrhis point has been argued fully above. 
This heing so, it is apparent as indicated at the out-
set of the argument herein, that the trial Court must have 
felt that there could be only one proximate cause of an 
accident. A review of the authorities clearly establishes 
that there can be two proximate causes each attributable 
to different actors, with recovery being allowed to a 
damaged plaintiff against either or both of the actors. 
The language of the Court in the case of Kline vs. 
Moyer, et al (1937), 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43, is pertinent. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in it~ decision 
''Without discussing them at length, it is suf-
ficient to note an almost continuous succession of 
recent cases in each of which an innocent passeng-
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er in an automobile was allowed to recover for in-
juries sustained as the result of a collision be-
tween the car in which plaintiff was riding and 
anoth~ vehicle negligently parked upon the 
highway, the recovery being either against the 
owner of the standing vehicle, or against both such 
owner and the negligent driver of plaintiff's car. 
In either ·event these decisions necessarily in-
volved a conclusion that the negligence of the 
owner of the parked vehicle was in whole or part 
a proximate cause of the accident.'' 
The Court then cites a series of eases to ::;upport ib 
statement. 
Further on, the smne Court states, 
''We would formulate the general principle as 
follows: Where a second actor has become aware 
of the existence of a potential danger created by 
the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and 
thereafter, by an independant act of negligence, 
brings about an accident, the first tort-feasor is 
relieved of liability, because the condition created 
by him was merely a circmnstance of the acci-
dent and not its proximate cause. Where, how-
ever, the second actor does not become apprised of 
such danger until his own negligence, added to 
.that of the existing perilous condition, has made 
the accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the 
two tort-feasors are contributing causes and prox-
. imate factors in the happening of the accident 
and impose liability upon both of the guilty 
parties''. 
, This Penns~'lvania decision is also found at 111 A. 
L. R . .fOG, and is followed by an annotation at page -U2 
where there is collected a number of eases frmn · dif-
, .G~ 
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with head-lights burning were approaching him from 
the left front and he swung over to the right to the out-
side lane £or ''slow'' traffic. He was driving at a moder-
ate rateof speed. 11 R., 12 R., 13 R., 14 R. 
Judges, Supreine Court and District Court, own, ride 
In, drive automobiles. They know that visibility .(ex-
cepting dust, rain and fog) is poorest, not at night, but 
at dusk and dawn. They have eyes. They know that 
bright lights ahead blind drivers until reached and 
passed. They know that s1nall stationary lights do not 
attract attention so much as when in motion, and when 
between the driver's eye and a brighter, bigger light 
elevated, they give little, if any notice to an approach-
ing driver. Judges know that in four lane highway.s 
the slow lanes are outside. 
This Court has recognized for a number of years 
that more than one separate act of negligence, even 
though they do not happen sin1ultaneously, may be prox-
jnlate causes of an injury. 
Hillyard vs. Utalz By-Products Company, (1953), 
(Utah) 263 P. (2d) 287. 
In the Hillyard rase, this Court quotes frmn Pro-
fessor Bohlen, as follows : 
''The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even though 
his wrong has merely set the stage on w·hich the 
later wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's injury, is 
in most jurisdiction no longer relieved from re-
sponsibility n1erely because the later act of the 
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other wrongdoer has been a means by which his 
own misconduct was made harmful. The test has 
come to be whether the later act, which realized 
the harmful potentialities of the situation created 
by the defendant, was itself foreseeable.'' 
This Court went on to pronounce its own doctrine, 
as follows, (page 291) 
''The doctrine enunciated in the above quotations 
is based upon the proposition that one cannot ex-
cuse himself from liability arising from his negli-
gent acts merely because the later negligence of 
another concurs to cause an injury, if the later act 
was a legally foreseeable event. This has also fre-
quently been announced as the law by various 
courts. 
The Hillyard case is also authority for the proposi-
tion that "the parking of a vehicle upon the paved or 
traveled portion of a highway is generally regarded as 
a hazard to traffic thereon''. 
rrhe negligence, if any, of plaintiff's husband was 
not imputable to her. 59 A. L. R. 153, Annotation, Neg-
ligence of One Spouse as Imputed to Other Because of 
l\I arital Relationship Itself, supplemented in 110 A. L. 
R. 1099, citing the Utah case of Jackson vs. Utah Rapid 
Transit Co., (1930) 77 Utah 21, 290 Pac. 970, in support 
of the general rule that the negligence of a husband 
will not, merely because of the marital relationship, be 
imputed to the wife in an action brought to recover for 
personal injuries sustained by her. See also 90 A. L. 
R. 630, Annotation, Negligence of Driver of Automobile 
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as Inipritable to Passenger, supple1nented in 123 A. L. R. 
l:i71. The same rule is stated in 5 Am .Jur., Automobiles, 
Sec .. 498, p. 784. 
The laws 'of Idaho are presumed to be the same as 
the laws of Utah, in the absence of proof to the contrary, 
and the courts will not take judicial notice of foreign 
la-w. 
Dickson vs. Mullings, et al, 66 Utah 282, 241 Pac. 
840; 
United Air Lines Trans. Corp. vs. Industrial 
Comm., 107 Utah 52; 151 P (2d) 591; 
Whitmore Oxygen Co. vs. Utah State Tax Com-
msision, 114 Utah 1, 196 P (2d) 976; 
Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (Utah) 
239 P (2d) 162 at 171. 
The California cases which impute negligence from 
one spo1.1se to the other were based on the fact or law 
that in California there is community property and that 
as the husband would be the owner of half of any re-
covery he would not be allowed to profit by his own 
contributon~ negligence. But this rule does not apply 
in the present case because: (1) There is no showing that 
Idaho is a community property State: and (2) Such a 
rule does not apply even in a cmmnunity property state 
when the husband and wife are residents of a place which 
does not have eonununity property, such as Montana. 
Bruton vs. r illoria, (Cal., 1956) 292 P. (2d) 638. The 
proof is that plaintiff and her husband were residents of 
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Montana, that the husband owned the car, that plaintiff 
had no interest in it nor any control over it. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the 
present status of the law, recognized by this Court, is 
that more than one separate act of negligence may be 
proximate causes of injuries and damages to an in-
nocent party, with recovery being allowed against either 
or both of the actors. Such being the status of the law, 
the judgement of the District Court ahould be reversed 
and the cause re1nanded with direction to the District 
Court to assess damages in plaintiff's favor. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CHARLES P. OLSON, 
JOHN H. JARDINE, 
MAURY, SHONE & SULLIVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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